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FOREWORD 
The 1992 World Conference on Environment and Development, to take place in 
Brazil, is intended to address forces which appear to be on a collision course: first, the 
ever-increasing degradation of the environment and our life support system by human- 
kind and, second, the need and desire of the heavily populated, less developed regions of 
the world to increase their standard of living and in all likelihood add to the enormous 
stress to the environment already imposed by the industrialized countries. Obviously, 
agreement on a global scale will be needed to solve this apparent dilemma in two 
ways: first, the industrialized regions must reduce the burden that they have already 
placed upon the environment and, second, the less developed regions must be helped to 
develop in as environmentally friendly a way as possible. This paper represents a new 
phase in the work of IIASA's Environment Program: the examination of how global 
environmental change brought about by human activities may pose a risk to the security 
of the world, and some of the measures that humankind might consider in managing this 
risk. 
Bo R. Doos 
Leader 
Environment Program 
ABSTRACT 
Humanity's influence upon the environment is growing to encompass the globe and 
to extend in time to decades and even centuries. One particular global environmental 
problem, i.e., climatic change, could eventually lead to shifts in agricultural and forestry 
growing zones, changes in freshwater supply and a rise in sea level, and eventually to mi- 
gration and "environmental refugees". This could further result in civil unrest, political 
instability, militarism, and terrorism which could pose as large a threat to world security 
as the ideological struggle from which we appear to be emerging. The trace gases leading 
to climatic change, especially carbon dioxide and methane, are closely linked with the 
production of energy. A more efficient use of energy, both in the developed and develop 
ing world, should be the first and main strategy for attacking the impending global threat 
of climatic change. Incentives for increasing energy efficiency in the developed world 
should be through the imposition of resource taxes such as carbon taxes. In the develop 
ing world, energy efficiency and development could advance hand in hand, if the proper 
infrastructure were created. This could be financed at least partially by the resource 
taxes collected in the developed world. 
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GLOBAL SECURITY - THE THREATS ARE CHANGING 
Roderick W. Shaw 
1. In t roduc t ion  
Since the end of the Second World War, the most eerious perceived threat to  global 
security has been a nuclear holocaust brought about by the superpowers, competing in the 
global arena with different ideologies and economic structures. Although this threat has 
not entirely disappeared, recently it appears to have diminished greatly because of the 
increased enlightenment of world leaders, and the political and economic changes that 
have been taking place in eastern Europe. Naturally, adjusting to  these changes is not 
proving to  be easy for those concerned, and associated threats to  world security remain. 
Nevertheless, the threat of nuclear destruction or a 'nuclear wintern, a t  least one stem- 
ming from ideological conflicts among the superpowers, seems to  be less than it was ten 
years ago (Strong, 1989). 
Despite these encouraging signs, one should recognize that other threats to  world 
security (hitherto in the background) remain, and are probably growing. These threats 
stem from humanity's ever-increasing alteration of the physical, chemical and biological 
environment, which could bring hardship to  many millions of people and lead to  political 
and military conflict. Not only is our influence on the environment intensifying, but its 
spatial scale is growing to  encompass the globe, and its temporal scale extending to  
decades and possibly even centuries. 
This paper will briefly review man's increasing influence on the environment and 
then focus on global scale environmental problems, in particular the alteration of our 
climate through emissions into the atmosphere of radiatively influential trace gases (the 
-called 'greenhouse gasesn). The global effects will be discussed, including how they 
could decrease global security. Finally, some approaches to  decreasing these threats will 
be discussed. 
2. The Increasing Scale of Humanity 's  Influence on the Envi ronment  
The spatial and temporal scale on which human activities affect our environment 
has been expanding, especially during this century. Local pollution, notably in cities, has 
existed for many centuries and remains with us today. In many cities, especially in the 
developed world, concentrations of sulfur dioxide and suspended particulate matter 
decreased between 1973 and 1985. However, concentrations in other cities, including, for 
example, many in China and some in India, exceed World Health Organization guidelines 
for sulfur dioxide from 3 to  146 days per year, and those for suspended particulate matter 
from 100 to 273 days per year (GEMS, 1989). Although it may be argued that 
widespread urban pollution is not a local problem, local action (not necessarily locally 
financed) in individual cities can address it. 
During the past several decades the distance between the polluter and the polluted 
has been steadily increasing; for example, atmospheric pollution no longer respects nation- 
al or even continental boundaries. About twenty years ago we became aware of the 
acidification of lakes and soils in Europe and in North America due to the transboundary 
atmospheric transport of oxides of sulfur and nitrogen, primarily from burning fossil fuels 
for energy (Sweden, 1972). Oxides of sulfur and nitrogen have atmospheric lifetimes of 
several hours to several days, which means that, before they are deposited from the atmo- 
sphere by diffusion, impaction and precipitation, they are transported across national 
boundaries by the wind. This results in a complex exchange of sulfur and nitrogen com- 
pounds between Canada and the United States, and among the European countries. 
It is possible that a similar problem is also occurring in Asia. China is presently 
emitting about 13 to  14 million tonnes of SO2 per year (GEMS, 1989), about one-third 
that of all Europe, and this rate will in all likelihood increase with the industrialization 
taking place there. It is likely that a t  least some of these emissions are being transported 
across China's boundaries. 
Because of these transboundary exchanges, addressing the problem of regional 
acidification, known popularly as "acid rain", requires a cooperative approach on a con- 
tinental scale among countries. This is already being done in Europe under the aegis of 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution, which was signed by 34 countries in 1979. Under this 
Convention, two Protocols have been signed; the first in 1979 to  limit European SO2 
emissions by about 25% (from 1980 values) by 1994; and the second, signed in 1988, to  
limit emissions of nitrogen oxides. It appears that, although these Protocols are good first 
steps towards reducing acidification, they will not protect sensitive ecosystems or halt the 
ongoing acidification of forest soil in Europe (Arnann, 1989; Shaw, 1989). Further steps 
are needed, and a systems analysis approach is being taken to develop new protocols using 
the Regional Acidification Information and Simulation (RAINS) model developed a t  
IIASA (Alcamo et al., 1987 and 1990). Use of the RAINS model indicates that interna- 
tional cooperation, possibly involving transfers of funds between east and west Europe, is 
needed. It is likely that, should the problem of regional acidification need to  be addressed 
in Asia, assessment models similar to RAINS would be useful tools. 
At present, the scale of humanity's effects upon the environment is spreading even 
beyond the regional to the global scale. The depletion of the protective ozone layer in the 
Antarctic and the Arctic, and climatic change are now recognized as potential global 
threats. Both of these problems are involved with the alteration of the atmosphere's 
radiative qualities by long-lived trace gases that are globally distributed within the atmo- 
sphere. Depletion of the ozone layer by chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) will increase the 
earth's exposure to  biologically harmful ultraviolet radiation. Climatic change may be 
brought about by increasing concentrations of "greenhouse gases", mainly carbon dioxide, 
methane, CFCs, and N20 and may manifest itself as altered patterns of temperature and 
precipitation, sea level rise and changes in vegetation patterns affecting both forests and 
agriculture. Climatic change could then lead to  increased threats to global security 
through migration due to coastal flooding, and competition for scarce water and food s u p  
plies and for other resources such as wood. The threats could take the form of civil 
unrest, intercountry conflicts and terrorism. 
This paper will focus on climatic change because of its widespread potential effects 
and, as will be seen, its strong links to the production of the energy that we use to carry 
out our lives. 
3. Causes, Nature and Extent of Climatic Change 
(a) Physical basis for climatic change 
Our atmosphere/ocean system is a giant heat engine, fueled by the sun, which 
transfers energy from low latitude regions (which receive an excess of solar energy), to 
high latitudes (which have a deficit). The structure of the atmosphere, including wind, 
temperature and precipitation patterns, is a result of a balance between the incoming 
short-wave solar energy (some of which is reflected by the earth and the atmosphere) and 
long-wave energy emitted according to Kirchoffs law by the earth and the atmosphere 
including clouds. It follows, then, that any change in the radiative properties of the 
atmosphere will ultimately change the climate. How and when and to what extent this 
might occur is still a matter of great scientific controversy. 
Certain trace gases act as important long-wave absorbers and re-emittors in the 
atmosphere. Some of them are long-lived and, because human activities are an important 
source of them, their concentrations have been steadily increasing. These 'greenhouse 
gasesn (somewhat a misnomer because a greenhouse is warm in winter because the glass 
also prevents convective dissipation of the heat) are carbon dioxide, methane, 
chlorofluorocarbons and N20. Table 1 summarizes the global sources of theee gases. 
Although there are large uncertainties, humanity is a significant source of methane and 
nitrous oxides and the only source for CFCs. Humanity d m  not appear to be such a 
large source for carbon dioxide compared to natural sources, but it must be kept in mind 
that the carbon cycle is a delicate balance between sources and sinks and the increase in 
anthropogenic emissions has tipped the balance. As shown by Table 2, concentrations of 
carbon dioxide have increased from preindustrial values of about 275 ppm to present 
values of over 340 ppm. Table 2 shows that even larger increases have been estimated for 
the other greenhouse gases. 
The reason for the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations is their long atmo- 
spheric lifetimes as shown in Table R This is in contrast to the acidifying pollutants 
described previously; these are mostly removed from the atmosphere in a matter of hours 
or days. In contrast, each annual emission of a greenhouse gas, because of its long life- 
time, can be assumed to become relatively uniformly mixed in the atmosphere. During 
subsequent decades, the mass of that particular annual emission remaining in the atmo- 
sphere is decreased, due to uptake by the oceans and by terrestrial biota. Before the 
Industrial Revolution, the atmosphere had reached an equilibrium of about 275 ppm C02.  
Since then, however, the ever increasing annual anthropogenic emissions have outstripped 
the sink mechanisms with the result that atmospheric concentrations have been steadily 
increasing and are expected to continue to do so. Figure 1, from Bolin et al. (1986), 
shows a steady increase in atmospheric concentrations of C 0 2  a t  Mauna Loa Observatory, 
Hawaii. Despite the pronounced annual cycle due to biological activity, there appears to 
be an ever-increasing slope in the smoothed curve. 
(b)  Possible degree and extent  of climatic change 
The effect of the increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases upon the radiation 
balance and the temperature, wind and precipitation patterns in the atmosphere is still a 
matter of conjecture. As in other matters, one has two possible routes: observation and 
model calculations. With respect to observations, regular temperature measurements 
have been made for over one hundred years. Figure 2 shows the global average surface 
temperature change during the past century. No correction has been made in the figure 
for urban warming, which is estimated to be 0.2.C. Is the apparent increase in mean tem- 
perature significant, and if so, can it be linked to greenhouse gas emissions? This question 
has not yet been answered. A report of the George C. Marshall Institute in the United 
States has concluded that the global temperature rise of 0.5.C during the past century 
cannot be linked with greenhouse gas emissions and warns against hasty action to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, saying that funds spent to improve forecasts would be money 
better spent. Needless to say, the report has generated much controversy in the United 
States and elsewhere. Even if one accepts the conclusions of the report, i t  should be kept 
in mind that it deals with what has happened in  the past and not with what could happen 
in the future from continued emissions of greenhouse gases. These can only be estimated, 
however imperfectly, by global climate models. 
There are many models of global climate change of varying complexity, and space 
here does not permit a thorough review of them. Figure 3 shows one example of an 
output of one of the global change models, that of Washington and Meehl (1984), for a 
doubling of C 0 2  concentration. Note that the temperature increases are much greater 
during high latitude winters than at lower latitudes. Not only would temperature be 
affected, but precipitation as well. Figure 4 shows the predictions by the British Meteor* 
logical Office model (Mitchell, 1983 as reported by Stigliani et of., 1989) of changes in 
precipitation in Europe resulting from a doubling of C 0 2  concentration. (This model also 
predicts large wintertime temperature increases in mid to high latitudes.) In Figure 4, 
there are decreases in precipitation at mid latitudes in summertime, and slight increases 
at  higher latitudes. In the wintertime, the increases are larger. 
(c) Ecological effects of climatic change 
The above possible changes in climate could have significant biological effects, 
influencing both agriculture and forestry. For example, the model of Washington and 
Weehl (1984) predicts for a doubling of C 0 2  an increase in mil moisture at  mid latitudes 
in North America, and a decrease throughout Africa and in large parts of Southeast Asia 
(Figure 5). It would appear that the areas with more favorable growing conditions for 
both trees and certain food crops could shift northward. IIASA has developed a model of 
global vegetation change based upon the Holdridge Climatological Classification System 
(Crarner and Leemans, 1990). Figure 6 shows the predictions of this model with respect 
to the boreal forest; the northward shift of the favorable growing climate is evident. 
However, could the forests migrate quickly enough to keep pace with the shifting climate 
zone? The seeds of trees migrate via the wind and birds. Figure 7 shows that the 
advance of trees can be very slow indeed, depending upon the species, from a few meters 
to one or two kilometers per year (Huntley and Birks, 1983). 
With respect to agriculture, greenhouse studies have indicated that increased C 0 2  
could enhance photosynthesis. For example, a doubling of ambient C 0 2  concentration 
could cause an increase in growth of from 10 to 15% in wheat, soybean and rice (Warrick 
et al., 1986). I f  one includes changes in climate however, the situation becomes much 
more complex. For example, grain production is likely to d e c r e e  in the present core 
areas by 3 to 17% (Warrick et al., 1986). These same authors suggest, however, that 
increases in precipitation may partially offset the effects of a temperature increase. Few 
systematic studies of the impacts of possible climatic change have been conducted for the 
tropics and subtropics. 
In the tropics, rainfall rather than temperature is the primary climate variable 
affecting agriculture (Warrick et al., 1986). In the semiarid tropics, planting depends 
upon the first rains. Small variations in the amount and timing of rainfall can cause large 
interannual variability in yields. In the humid tropics, food production depends not only 
upon the timely appearance of the monsoon, but also upon its strength and reliability 
throughout the growing season. Because of the possibility of damage to crops that have 
already been planted, late heavy rains are often just a .  disruptive as the late arrival of 
rain. 
A recently published study a t  IIASA on the effects of climatic change on agriculture 
(Parry et al., 1988) indicates that, in cool temperate and cold regions, the changes in the 
length of the potential growing season and plant growth rates would lead to a shift in 
crop types and even the replacement of certain types of farming in some regions (e.g., of 
livestock by arable farming). There could also be changes in the incidence of agricultural 
pests and diseases. In semiarid regions, the IIASA study indicates that there could be 
substantial year-byear variability of yield levels and substantial within-season variabili- 
ty due to variations in the timing of rainfall. There could also be significant shifts of crop 
potential, leading to major movements of the boundaries of agroclimatic zones. 
At all latitudes, the potential for the greatest effect from climatic change could be in 
marginal areas. Localities with steep gradients in temperature and precipitation are sen- 
sitive not only to changes in long-term mean valuea but in the occurrence of fluctuations 
about the mean. 
Unfortunately, predictions of global climate models about the occurrence of extreme 
events such as droughts and floods are even more uncertain than their predictions about 
mean values. 
(d) Effect upon  sea level 
It is generally accepted that the effect of the predicted climatic change will be an 
increase in sea level due to thermal expansion of the ocean, melting of the glaciers, abla- 
tion of the Greenland ice cap, and increase of the area of Antarctica. The expected rim in 
sea level varies according to the models that are used; by the year 2100, it could be 0.2 to  
0.7 meters (Raper et al., 1990). This means that low-lying coastal communities would 
have to increase measures against high tidea and storm surges; the implications for coun- 
tries such as Bangladesh could be significant, especially with respect to storm surges 
which have caused catastrophes in the past. If the effect of climatic change, apart from a 
rise in mean sea level, were to increase the frequency of storminess in Southeast Asia, the 
effects could be serious indeed. 
Walter and Ayres (1990) have estimated, using the work of Nordhaus (1989)) that it 
would cost 2.5 to 5 trillion dollars to protect the coastlines of the world from the expected 
rise in sea level; spread over 50 years it would amount to 0.2 to 0.4% of the gross world 
annual income. 
(e) Effect u p o n  global security 
From the above discussion, it is possible that flooding of coastal areas, apart from 
the death and destruction that it would cause, could lead to forced migration and desta- 
bilization of the destinations of the migrants. Migration and/or civil unrest could also be 
the result of disruption of food and water supplies and scarcity of other raw materials 
such as wood. 
Figure 8 (Source: B.R. Doos, personal communication, 1990) shows that, in some 
African countries, a combination of drought and civil war brought about mass migrations, 
refugees and famine. In most of these countries, the prime cause of the refugee movement 
and the famine was probably not the drought itself, but a combination of long, continu- 
ously unwise use of land and livestock populations, making people vulnerable to drought. 
In many of these countries in 1984, the value of arms imported exceeded the value of 
imported grain. 
Although the regions which are severely affected by global environmental changes 
might actually be a small fraction of the area of the world, our recent experience with 
events in the Middle East has taught us that regional unrest can cause destabilization, 
such as terrorism, well beyond the boundaries of the directly affected region. 
In addition to the threats to world security brought about by the global environmen- 
tal changes themselves, there could also be threats brought about by efforts to forestall or 
reverse the changes, as will be discussed in Section 4 to follow. Suggestions to slow the 
emissions of greenhouse gases in Third World countries by limiting their industrial 
growth will be seen by them to be uecological colonialismn. Although many regional 
problems such as desertification and destruction to the tropical rain forests may have 
been brought about by practices in developing countries, they have often been aa a result 
of commercial pressure from industrialized countries and indeed, many of the impending 
global problems are a legacy of the excesses of the developed world. As will be seen in 
Section 4, the implementation of measures to reduce global environmental change will 
require not only technological skill but a careful and equitable political approach. 
Relatively little work has been done on the effects of environmental change upon 
global security. At the present time, IIASA is initiating a study that will explore the 
limits to  human development (in terms of population and consumption of energy and 
materials) that will be imposed by life support systems (for example, food and water) not 
meeting the demands of the population, and by degradation of life support systems by 
environmental change. It is hoped that the study, which is intended to  provide some of 
the input to  the 1992 World Conference on Environment and Development, will indicate 
boundaries to  human behavior that will promote sustainable development. 
4. Addressing the Greenhouse Problem from 
the Point of View of Global Security 
(a) A classical dilemma 
Global climatic change shares many of the classical attributes and dilemma of other 
environmental problems. First of all, there is great scientific uncertainty. Second, the 
costs of preventative and remedial action are potentially enormous, not only in monetary 
but also in human terms. Should we wait and see what happens so that the scientific 
uncertainty may be decreased, or should we initiate expensive and difficult measures now 
that may turn out in the long term to  be ineffectual or inefficient? 
Policymakers have been faced with similar dilemma in other problems such as 
transboundary air pollution leading to regional acidification. In Europe at  least, action 
has been taken before all of the scientific uncertainties have been resolved (they still 
haven't been!) and it is expected that these measures, and others to follow, will have 
beneficial effects upon the environment. To an even greater degree than regional 
acidification, climatic change has a long time horizon (probably one or two centuries) and 
long time lags for the processes operating within that time horizon. This makes the above 
dilemma even more agonizing. 
Two possible approaches are open to  us with respect to  climatic change: adaption 
and prevention. Adaption would mean building defences such as dikes against sea level 
rise, or restructuring our agriculture and forest industries to  account for shifts in climatic 
zones. Undoubtedly some adaptive measures will be needed, a t  least in the short and 
medium run, because so much of the greenhouse gases from past and present emissions 
will remain in the atmosphere, making some climatic change inevitable. However, our 
ability to  adapt may be limited by the material and social structures that are presently in 
place (people often live where they do because it is the best place for many reasons 
besides climate) and because the environmental changes may be so great. Uncertainty 
also plays a role; adaptive measures, like the preventative measures to  be discussed below, 
require long lead times for planning. Like prevention, we run the risk of spending the 
money in the wrong place a t  the wrong time. 
As in the case of many threats, prevention or a t  least forestalling is an attractive 
approach. The various factors affecting preventative measures will now be discussed. As 
in the case of other examples of atmospheric contamination, reductions of the greenhouse 
gas emissions underlying the problem are needed. As will be seen, the selection of which 
greenhouse gases to  abate, and the timing of the emission reductions is determined by 
environmental considerations; the location of the emission reductions is determined by 
social, economic and political factors. 
(b) Selection and timing of greenhouse gas abatement 
With respect to  the selection of greenhouse gases to  be abated, and the timing of the 
emission reductions, several factors must be considered: 
(i) Some greenhouse gases contribute more to  the problem than others, due t o  their 
relative abundance in the atmosphere and their relative effect on a unit mass basis. 
At the present time, carbon dioxide, CFCs and methane account for about 80% of 
the calculated temperature rise (Figure 9). Hopefully, emissions of CFCs will be 
reduced as a result of the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol. Anthropo- 
genic emissions of carbon dioxide and methane are heavily linked with the genera- 
tion of energy, although deforestation is also an important source of C 0 2  (Bolin et 
al., 1986). It is obvious, therefore, that strategies t o  forestall and reduce climatic 
change must involve our systems of energy generation. 
~ i )  There are long time lags involved with reducing greenhouse gas emissions, as shown 
in Figure 10. These lags include the political time lags (At) needed for public 
opinion and political will to  decide to  implement measures; t E" e technologicd time 
delay (At)t, needed for changes in the energy-generating and other infrastructures, 
and the installation of control equipment; the atmospheric time delay (At)ry due to  
the long atmospheric residence times of greenhouse gases, and the ecologacd time 
delay (At),, needed for an ecosystem to respond to  climatic changes. Integrated 
models that take into account (At)t, and (At),, already exist; an example is shown 
in Figure 11 of the Integrated Model for Assessing the Greenhouse Effect (IMAGE) 
developed by Rotmans et al. (1988). Note that, even for scenario D involving a 
halving of C 0 2  emissions between 1985 and the year 2100, and very large decreases 
in CFC production, the atmospheric concentration of C 0 2  continues to  increase to  
the year 2100 and the global mean temperature decreases only slightly after the year 
2060. Long-range thinking is indeed in order! 
(c) Choosing where  to reduce  greenhouse gas  emfssions 
The relatively short-lived atmospheric pollutants leading to  regional acidification do 
not have time to  be uniformly mixed in the atmosphere before being deposited; therefore, 
different source regions affect sensitive receptors to  varying degrees. This means that 
emission reductions for regional acidification must vary from country to  country to be 
most effective. In contrast, greenhouse gases are relatively uniformly mixed in the atmo- 
sphere due t o  their long lifetimes; reduction of their concentrations requires a reduction in 
global emissions. Any region-to-region variations in greenhouse gas emissions would 
depend not upon meteorological but upon social and economic factors. These factors will 
be discussed next; let us confine ourselves to  energy-related greenhouse gas emissions and 
in particular carbon dioxide. 
The energy-related C 0 2  emission Q for a region may be stated as 
where P is the population of the region, D the per capita energy demand and E the C 0 2  
emission per unit of energy supplied. Figure 18 (Diiijs, 1990) shows the per capita carbon 
dioxide emissions for various countries in the year 1985. Although there is a global aver- 
age per capita emission of 1 tonne carbon per year, there are large variations from a few 
tenths of a tonne C per year for developing countries to  several tonnes C per year for 
developed countries such as the USA, Canada and eastern Germany (formerly the GDR). 
The table a t  the bottom of Figure 18 shows that, in 1985, the global population of 
five billion people resulted in a global C 0 2  emission of 5 billion tonnes C a-l. h u m i n g  
a modest increase in per capita emissions t o  1.5 tonnes C a-l by the year 2030 (largely 
from the development expected in the Third World), and an expected increase in the 
world population to  8 billion, the global emissions would be 12 billion tonnes C a-l. This 
would be an increase of 140% from 1985, not the 20% decrease so optimistically proposed 
at  the World Conference on the Changing Atmosphere in Toronto in June 1988. Indeed, 
to  bring about a 20% decrease in global emissions with the same population pro'ections, 
per capita carbon dioxide emissions would have to  be reduced to  0.3 tonnes C a-j, a 70% 
reduction from present values! 
Figure 13 shows how the various regions of the world will contribute to  global 
carbon emissions. In 1985, the OECD countries will be responsible for about half of the 
global C 0 2  emissions, the Soviet Union and eastern Europe together contribute about 
25%; the other 25% comes from China and the rest of the world. By 2010, China and the 
rest of the world will contribute about 35%; by 2030, their share may be half of the global 
emission of 12 billion tonnes per year. In absolute terms, the emissions of China and the 
rest of the world may increase from 1.4 t o  between 5 and 6 billion tonnes C per year. Is 
there a way out? 
Krause et 41. (1988) have proposed an ultimate limit of 400 ppm C 0 2  for the atmo- 
sphere; this bubble would be allotted among the nations of the world. The authors state 
that the only practical way to meet the requirements of this bubble is for the developed 
countries to reduce their fossil fuel releaaes by 2% per year until the year 2020. In the 
meantime, developing countries would attempt t o  keep their per capita emissions to 1985 
levels; their total emissions would, of course, still increase by two-thirds due to population 
increases. After 2025, fossil fuel consumption would gradually drop to  zero during the 
next 100 years. The decreases are shown in Figure 14. 
This scenario is extremely optimistic and does not state precisely how it would be 
achieved, or how much it would cost. It does illustrate, however, the strict measures that 
would be required to keep the global mean C 0 2  concentration to  a level that is 60 ppm 
above the present values. 
Equation (1) shows clearly the factors involved in reducing C 0 2  emissions: by 
reducing population, or by reducing per capita energy demand, or by reducing emission 
per unit energy produced, or a combination thereof. In the developed world, population is 
relatively stable. In the developing world, large increases are expected (Figure 15). Sta- 
bilizing or reducing population in the Third World will be difficult; reductions in 
birthrates often come about with an increase in affluence and educational level. But this 
begs the question: How? 
Per capita energy-related emissions are the product D x E in Equation (1). The 
very high per capita emissions in the developed world are a result of energy-intensive 
industry, an affluent lifestyle and little incentive for efficiency of use for energy and 
materials. Ayres (1989) has stated that material and energy is underpriced, a t  least in 
the developed world. The price includes only the cost of extracting the materials or 
energy, its processing and its distribution. It does not include the environmental price, 
e.g., the damage to  forests from acidifying emissions, health effects from polluted air and 
contaminated water supplies, the possible costs of raising dikes, or the cost of increased 
skin cancer from the depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer. Admittedly, i t  is 
extremely difficult to estimate these environmental costs, but assuming a value of zero is 
certainly not correct! Chizhov and Styrikovich (1988) estimate that the environmental 
damages per ton of coal equivalent due to a thermal power station are as follows: coal 
US$107-117, residual oil US$92-106, gas US$30-36. Nordhaus (1989) estimated that the 
marginal damages of fossil fuel emissions due to global environmental change would be 3.3 
to 26.9 U.S. dollars per ton equivalent, or 1.2 to 12.9 U.S. cents per kilogram carbon. 
Adding an environmental tax to  materials and energy could have two effects: i t  
could diminish the per capita demand, and ways might be sought to find ways of satisfy- 
ing the demand while emitting less. An example of this was the effect of the oil embargo 
in the early 19708, especially in North America. When prices rose (admittedly not for 
environmental reasons), the fuel efficiency of North American automobiles improved to  
hitherto unknown values. Unfortunately, the recent relaxation of prices has seen some 
return of powerful automobiles both in North America and in Europe. Table 3 from 
Goldemberg et al. (1988), shows the possibilities for reductions in energy consumption in 
several selected areas. There would be a capital cost involved with replacement of older 
equipment with newer, more efficient versions but, in the long run, there could be a net 
saving in terms of increased competitiveness, even if one does not include the environmen- 
tal benefits. Figure 16 shows the decrease in total coats for an automobile resulting from 
an increase in fuel price. Note that the incremental savings do decrease, however, as fuel 
consumption drops below 4 or 5 liters per 100 km. Again, these costs do not include the 
environmental benefits. In terms of global carbon emissions, an increased fuel efficiency of 
automobiles will certainly be needed to offset the expected increase in car populations in 
developing countries. 
Suppose that a carbon tax of 10 U.S. cents per kilogram carbon were imposed and 
let us suppose for the moment that it is imposed only in the developed countries. Such a 
tax would raise the price of a liter of gasoline about 6 U.S. cents and that of a tonne of 
coal by 80 U.S. dollars. These are significant price increases, more than a doubling of the 
present price of coal. Ayres and Walter (1990) estimate that doubling the price of coal 
would produce about US$35 per tonne in revenues and at  the same time save U S 3 0  per 
tonne in environment a1 damage. Nevertheless, adjustments were made to  the large 
increases in oil prices in the 19709, and even within the developed world people accornrno- 
date large differences in fuel prices. For example, gasoline prices in Austria are three 
times that in the United States. A tax of 10 U.S. cents kg-' is about one-half of that 
proposed for C02 emissions by the Swedish Parliament. In 1985, the tax revenue from 
imposing the carbon tax in the developed world would have been 270 billion dollars per 
year, about one-quarter of the estimated annual amount spent on arms worldwide or 
of the order of one hundred times the annual rate of expenditures by multilateral and 
bilateral aid agencies in the energy area (Goldemberg et al., 1988, Table 5.2). How this 
revenue could be spent will be discussed below. Interestingly, Walter and Ayres (1990) 
estimate that the total cost of sea level rise, including coastal protection, loss of land 
value and resettling refugees, spread over 50 years would be 110-170 billion dollars per 
year. 
It is my opinion that such a tax imposed in the developing world would not only 
be insupportable, but unfair as well. The imposition of such taxes and the resulting 
inhibition of the development in the Third World would be looked upon as "ecological 
imperialismn, since much of the global problem can be looked upon as being due to  the 
extravagances of the industrialized world. Krause et al. (1988) state that, to  meet the 400 
ppm bubble described above, only 240 billion tonnes more carbon can be released into the 
atmosphere. If one started to  allot the 240 billion tonnes on a per capita basis, starting 
the accounting in 1950, the developed countries would have already overdrawn their 
account and the developing countries could not possibly use their allotment due t o  
economic and other constraints on their economic growth rates. Hence the phase-out 
scheme described in Figure 14. It is obvious that the Third World must and will develop; 
it is essential that it be done in as environmentally friendly a way as possible. In a sense, 
there is a "Catch 22" situation in which the birthrate may not decrease until the standard 
of living and education is raised, which in turn is difficult because of the demand of a 
large population. Johansson and Williams (1987) state that, with the appropriate infra- 
structure, it would be possible to  maintain amenities in developing countries typical of 
Western Europe today, with a final per capita energy use of 1 k W. The revenue obtained 
from a carbon tax in the developed world could be used to  help build an energy-efficient 
infrastructure that would provide a good standard of living. For example, with the 
proper assistance, there is no need for the Third World to  pass through the heavily pollut- 
ing inefficient industrial stage from which the developed world is hopefully emerging - it 
could "leapfrogn into efficient, less polluting industries. T o  use a pun, this could be at 
least partially done on the backs of the developed world. Figure 17 from Simonis (1989) 
plots for various countries indices of environmental impacts against gross domestic prod- 
uct per capita. Many developed countries are now creating less environmental damage 
per unit GNP than the less developed eastern European countries and Turkey and Yugos- 
lavia. It is quite likely that developed countries in Asia and Africa are on the left-hand 
side of the figure; must they go over the crest of environmental damage or can they go 
directly to  a more affluent and sustainable society? 
In India, measures such as replacing inefficient cooking stoves using gathered fuel- 
wood with more efficient versions using less wood or biogas derived from waste products 
or even solar collectors, and providing a basic level of electrical lighting with energy- 
efficient lamps instead of kerosene lamps (which are 200 times less efficient) would not 
only improve the standard of living, but would require leea energy and result in less 
environmental pollution and degradation. In transportation, replacement of diesel trucks 
by railways for goods transport, especially for long distances, would also be a more 
efficient use of fuel (Goldemberg et d., 1988). All of these measures, however, require 
changes in infrastructure which in turn require investment. 
Finally, it should be recognized that the increased use of nuclear energy has often 
been proposed as a solution both for regional acidification and for global climatic change. 
Nuclear plants do not emit sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide or carbon dioxide. However, 
apart from the very high capital costs and complex requirements for safe operation, and 
the present unsolved problem of radioactive waste, nuclear plants have a severe drawback 
from the point of view of global security. The risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons 
through the reprocessing of nuclear waste may be relatively minor today, but would 
increase enormously if nuclear power were to  be used on a much larger scale as it would 
be increasingly difficult to police the whereabouts of the nuclear material. The increased 
availability of fissionable materials, coupled with increased international tension if we are 
unable to  solve the disparities in the world which are all too evident, is a dangerous com- 
bination indeed and should make nuclear power an "energy technology of last resortn 
(Johansson and Williams, 1987). 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Humanity's influence upon the environment is growing to encompass the globe and 
to  extend in time to  decades and even centuries. One particular global environmental 
problem, i.e., climatic change, could eventually lead to shifts in agricultural and forestry 
growing zones, changes in freshwater supply and a rise in sea level. The possible disrup 
tion of supplies of food, freshwater and materials such as wood could lead to migration 
and "environmental refugeesn. This could further result in civil unrest, political instabil- 
ity, militarism, and terrorism which could pose as large a threat to  world security as the 
ideological struggle from which we appear to be emerging. 
The trace gases leading to  climatic change, especially carbon dioxide and methane, 
are closely linked with the production of energy. It is my opinion that a more efficient use 
of energy, both in the developed and developing world, should be the first and main 
strategy for attacking the impending global threat of climatic change. Incentives for 
increasing energy efficiency in the developed world should be through the imposition of 
resource taxes such as carbon taxes. It should be pointed out that such taxes could be 
applied to  other substances such as sulfur or CFCs or even hydrogen, since the last when 
burned for energy, emits water vapor which itself could have climatic consequences. 
In the developing world, energy efficiency and development could advance hand in 
hand, if the proper infrastructure were created. This could be financed a t  least partially 
by the resource taxes collected in the developed world. 
It is then a matter of those who are relatively well off helping those who are not, a 
form of insurance policy t o  reduce threats to global security. Although those in the 
developed world may see a transfer of resources from North to  South as a form of charity, 
in fact i t  may be a matter of global survival and as such could be justified even for selfish 
reasons. We are happy to  pay fire insurance premiums, and if our house does not burn 
down, we are still happy. 
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Table 1: Natural and Anthropogenic Emissions of Greenhouse Gases (from U.S. 
Department of Energy, 1988). 
Ca rbon  dioxide (1012 g C i l )  
Natural sources (oceanic, terrestrial) 
Anthropogenic: fossil fuel burning 
: deforestation, land use 
Methane (1012 g i l )  
Natural (wetland, termites, oceanic, 
animals, lakes, tundra) 
Anthropogenic (cattle, rice paddies, 
biomass burning, natural gas, solid 
waste) 
Ni t rous  Oxide (N20) (1012 g N d l )  
Natural (soils, oceans, lightning) 
Anthropogenic (fossil fuels, cultivation, 
biomass burning) 
Natural 
Anthropogenic CFCls 
CF2 CL2 
None 
Table 2: Atmospheric and the residence time of the major greenhouse gases 
(Source: U.S. Department of Energy, 1988). 
Pre-industrial Present Lifetime 
Gas Concentration Concentration (years) 
C 0 2  ( P P ~ V )  275 346 50-200* 
CH4 (PPbv) 750 1,650 u 7-10 
N20 (PPbv) 280 305 u 150 
CFC13 (PPbv) 0 0.23 u 75 
CF2 c12 ( P ~ b v )  0 0.40 m 110 
*time for C 0 2  concentration to adjust to changes in emissions. 
Table  9: Examples of alternative energy intensities for various activities (from 
Goldemberg e t  al.  (1988)). 
Activity Unit Present Alternative 
Automobile 1 gasoline/100 km 10-15 2.3-5 
Residential 2 kJ/m floor area 120-160 15-50 
space heating 
Refrigeratorlfreezer k Wh/l capacity/year 3.4 0.7-1.7 
Steel production GJ/tonne steel 22-27 9-15 
Figure 1. Concentration of atmospheric GO2 at Mauna Loa Observatory, Hawaii. Dots indicate monthly averages deter- 
mined from continuous measurements. Based on data reported by Bacastow and Keeling (1981), supplemented 
by data from recent years supplied by personal communication. 
Figure 2. Calculated values of the increase of the mean annual surface temperature due to changes in greenhouse gas con- 
centrations from 1765 to present, together with projections forward to the year 2050 based on estimated future 
greenhouse gas concentration changes. The range of values between the upper and lower curve reflects the uncer- 
tainties in the climate system's equilibrium sensitivity to greenhouse gas concentration changes. The shorter 
record between the limiting curves represents the observed global mean surface temperature (Wigley, 1987). 
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Figure 3. Surface temperature change ('C) for a steady-state doubling of C02 
concentrations in (a) winter and, (b) summer (Washington and Meehl, 
1984). 
Legend : 
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Figure 4. Precipitation changes expected in summer (upper) and winter (lower) 
as a result of the equivalent doubling in concentration of C02 (in 
mm/day) (Mitchell, 1983). Note the increased precipitation over North- 
ern Europe and decrease over much of Southern Europe. 
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Figure 5. Geographical distribution of soil moisture differences in cm for 
December-February and June-August obtained by Washington and 
Meehl (1984) for 2 x C 0 2  - 1 x GO2. 
Figure 6. Shifts in climatic zones 
for wintergreen needle trees for 
a doubling of CO, 
concentrations (Leemans, 1989). 
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In several (most of all) of these countries the prime 
cause of the famine (and refugee movement) was probably 
not the drought itself, but a combination of long 
continuous bad land use and increased human and stock 
population making people vulnerable to drought. 
In many of these countries the value of arms imported 
exceeded the value of imported grain (1984) 
(from B.R. DBBs, 1990). 
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Figure 9. Cumulative equilibrium global surface temperature warming due to 
increases in carbon dioxide and other trace gases from 1980 to 2030. 
After Ramanathan et al. 1985. 
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Figure 10. Schematic of time lags involved in implementing a greenhouse gas con- 
trol strategythe technical time lag At,,,; the atmospheric time lag 
At,,; the ecological time lag (~t ) , , ;  the political time lag (At)pol. 
TlME IN YEARS 
TlME IN YEARS 
Figure 11. Upper panel: Four C02 emission scenarios. Lower panel: Corresponding 
global C02 concentrations as predicted by the Integrated Model for 
Assessing the Greenhouse Effect (Rotmans ct uf. 1988). 
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Figure 12. Per capital C 0 2  - C emissions in various countries in 1985 (Doos, 1990). 
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Figure 13. Carbon emissions (present and projected) for various regions of the 
world (International Energy Workshop, IIASA, Laxenburg, 1989). 
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Figure 16. The cost of driving in 1981 U.S. cents per km and per mile, versus automative fuel economy. The energy perfor- 
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1981 Volkswagen Rabbit (gasoline version). 
A9gregated per caplta Indices of cement productaon, energy consumptaon, 
crude steel consumptron and werght of frerght transport (Mean 1 9 7 0 / 1 5  - 0 )  
C m s s  DOrtFTIC PBamcT PtR CAPITA 
(US-( at 1980 pricea a d  e.cL.qe rates)  
Figure 17. Index of structural environmental impacts* per capita and economic performance level (1970 = */1985 = +) and 
Change (-------- > ) a  
